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Abstract
While pump-and-dump schemes have attracted the atten-
tion of cryptocurrency observers and regulators alike, this
paper represents the first detailed empirical query of pump-
and-dump activities in cryptocurrency markets. We present
a case study of a recent pump-and-dump event, investigate
412 pump-and-dump activities organized in Telegram chan-
nels from June 17, 2018 to February 26, 2019, and discover
patterns in crypto-markets associated with pump-and-dump
schemes. We then build a model that predicts the pump likeli-
hood of all coins listed in a crypto-exchange prior to a pump.
The model exhibits high precision as well as robustness, and
can be used to create a simple, yet very effective trading strat-
egy, which we empirically demonstrate can generate a return
as high as 60% on small retail investments within a span of
two and half months. The study provides a proof of concept
for strategic crypto-trading and sheds light on the application
of machine learning for crime detection.
1 Introduction
While pump-and-dump schemes are a well-trodden ruse in
conventional financial markets, the old-fashioned ploy has
found a new playground to thrive — cryptocurrency ex-
changes.
The relative anonymity of the crypto space has led to it
becoming a fertile ground for unlawful activities, such as cur-
rency theft (e.g. the DAO hack [1]), Ponzi schemes [26], and
pump-and-dump schemes that have each risen in popularity
in cryptocurrency markets over the last few years. Due to
their end-to-end encryption, programmability, and relative
anonymity, new social media tools such as Telegram1 and
Discord have become cryptocurrency enthusiasts’ preferred
communication vehicles. While pump-and-dump schemes
have been discussed in the press [29], we are not aware of a
comprehensive study of this phenomenon to date.
1Note that not all Telegram traffic is end-to-end encrypted.
Regulation: In February 2018, the CFTC (Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission) issued warnings to consumers [8]
about the possibility of cryptocurrency pump-and-dump
schemes. It also offered a substantial reward to whistle-
blowers around the same time [12].
In October 2018, the SEC (Securities and Exchange Com-
mission) filed a subpoena enforcement against an investment
company trust and trustee for an alleged pump-and-dump ICO
scheme [27].
Clearly, regulators are aiming to find perpetrators of pump-
and-dump schemes and to actively prosecute them.
This paper: In this paper, we trace the message history of
over 300 Telegram channels from June 17, 2018 to Febru-
ary 26, 2019, and identify 412 pump events orchestrated
through those channels. We analyze features of pumped
coins and market movements of coins before, during, and
after pump-and-dump. We develop a predictive random for-
est model that provides the likelihood of each possible coin
being pumped prior to the actual pump event. With an AUC
(area under curve) of the ROC (receiver operating character-
istic) curve of over 0.9, the model exhibits high accuracy in
predicting pump-and-dump target coins.
Contributions: This paper makes the following contribu-
tions:
• Longitudinal study: This paper is the first research
study that examines routinely organized pump-and-
dump events in the cryptocurrency space. We use
a unique dataset of pump-and-dump records from
June 17, 2018 to February 26, 2019 across multiple
crypto-exchanges and analyze crypto-market movements
associated with those pump-and-dump events.
• Analysis: Our analysis shows that pump-and-dump ac-
tivities are a lot more prevalent than previously believed.
Specifically, around 100 organized Telegram pump-and-
dump channels coordinate on average 2 pumps a day,
which generates an aggregate artificial trading volume
of 6 million USD a month. We discover that some ex-
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Figure 1: A successfully organized pump event. On the right hand side of the screenshot is the message history of a Telegram channel. The first message is the
final countdown; the second message is the coin announcement; the last message presents the pump result. On the left hand side is the market movement of the
corresponding coin around the pump time.
changes are also active participants in pump-and-dump
schemes.
• Prediction: We develop machine learning models that,
given pre-pump market movements, can predict the like-
lihood of each coin being pumped with an AUC (Area
Under Curve) of over 0.9 both in-sample and out-of-
sample. The models confirm that market movements
contain hidden information that can be utilized for mon-
etary purposes.
• Trading strategy: We formulate a simple trading strat-
egy which, when used in combination with a calibrated
prediction model, demonstrates a return of 60% over a
period of eleven weeks, even under strict assumptions.
Paper organization: The paper is structured as follows. In
Section 2 we provide background information on pump-and-
dump activities organized by Telegram channels. In Section 3
we present a pump-and-dump case study. In Section 4 we
investigate a range of coin features. In Section 5 we build a
prediction model that estimates the pump likelihood of each
coin for each pump, and propose a trading strategy along with
the model. In Section 6 we summarize the related literature.
In Section 7 we outline our conclusions. Finally, the Appendix
specifies parameters of the models we have used in this paper.
2 Background
A pump is a coordinated, intentional, short-term increase in
the demand of a market instrument — in our study, a cryp-
tocurrency — which leads to a price hike. With today’s chat
applications such as Telegram and Discord offering features
of encryption and anonymity, various forms of misconduct in
cryptocurrency trading are thriving on those platforms.
2.1 Pump-and-Dump Actors
Pump organizer: Pump organizers can be individuals, or,
more likely, organized groups, typically who use encrypted
chat applications to coordinate pump-and-dump events. They
have the advantage of having insider information and are the
ultimate beneficiaries of the pump-and-dump scheme.
Pump participants: Pump participants are cryptocurrency
traders who collectively buy a certain coin immediately after
receiving the instruction from the pump organizer on which
coin to buy, causing the price of the coin to be “pumped".
Many of them end up buying coins at an already inflated price
and are the ultimate victim of the pump-and-dump scheme.
Pump target exchange: A pump target exchange is the ex-
change selected by the pump organizer where a pump-and-
dump event takes place. Some exchanges are themselves di-
rectly associated with pump-and-dump. Yobit, for example,
has openly organized pumps multiple times (see Figure 2).
The benefits for an exchange to be a pump organizer are
threefold:
1. With coins acquired before a pump, it can profit by dump-
ing those coins at a higher, pumped price;
2. It earns high transaction fees due to increased trading
volume driven by a pump-and-dump;
3. Exchanges are able to utilize their first access to users’
order information for front-running during a frenzied
pump-and-dump.
2.2 A Typical Pump-and-Dump Process
Set-up: The organizer creates a publicly accessible group or
channel, and recruits as many group members or channel sub-
scribers as possible by advertising and posting invitation links
on major forums such as Bitcointalk, Steemit, and Reddit.
Telegram channels only allow subscribers to receive mes-
sages from the channel admin, but not post discussions in the
channel. In a Telegram group, members can by default post
messages, but this function is usually disabled by the group
admin to prohibit members’ interference. We use the terms
channel and group interchangeably in this paper.
Pre-pump announcement: The group is ready to pump once
it obtains enough members (typically above 1,000). The pump
organizer, who is now the group or channel admin, announces
details of the next pump a few days ahead. The admins broad-
cast the exact time and date of the announcement of a coin
which would then precipitate a pump of that coin. Other in-
formation disclosed in advance includes the exchange where
the pump will take place and the pairing coin2. The admins
advise members to transfer sufficient funds (in the form of
the pairing coin) into the named exchange beforehand.
While the named pump time is approaching, the admin
sends out countdowns, and repeats the pump “rules” such as:
1) buy fast, 2) “shill”3 the pumped coin on the exchange chat
box and social media to attract outsiders, 3) “HODL”4 the
coin at least for several minutes to give outsiders time to join
in, 4) sell in pieces and not in a single chunk, 5) only sell at a
profit and never sell below the current price. The admin also
gives members a pep talk, quoting historical pump profits, to
boost members’ confidence and encourage their participation.
Pump: At the pre-arranged pump time, the admin announces
the coin, typically in the format of an OCR (optical character
recognition)-proof image to hinder machine reading (Fig-
ure 1). Immediately afterwards, the admin urges members to
buy and hold the coin in order to inflate the coin price. During
the first minute of the pump, the coin price surges, sometimes
increasing several fold.
Dump: A few minutes (sometimes tens of seconds) after the
pump starts, the coin price will reach its peak. While the
admin might shout “buy buy buy” and “hold hold hold” in
the channel, the coin price keeps dropping. As soon as the
first fall in price appears, pump-and-dump participants start
to panic-sell. While the price might be re-boosted by the
second wave of purchasers who buy the dips (as encouraged
by channel admins), chances are the price will rapidly bounce
back to the start price, sometimes even lower. The coin price
declining to the pre-pump proximity also signifies the end
of the dump, since most investors would rather hold the coin
than sell at a loss.
Post-pump review: Within half an hour, after the coin price
and trading volume recover to approximately the pre-pump
levels, the admin posts a review on coin price change, typi-
cally including only two price points — start price (or low
price) and peak price, and touts how much the coin price in-
2A pairing coin is a coin that is used to trade against other coins. Bitcoin
(BTC) is a typical pairing coin.
3Crypto jargon for “advertise”, “promote”.
4Crypto jargon for “hold”.
(a) Tweets from @YobitExchange.
(b) Pump timer from the Yobit website.
Figure 2: The screen-shots demonstrate that the exchange Yobit was actively
involved in pump-and-dump activities.
Figure 3: A pump attempt coordinated by multiple channels not executed
due to unanticipated price movement of the to-be-pumped coin.
creased by the pump (Figure 1). Information such as trading
volume and timescale is only selectively revealed: if the vol-
ume is high, and the pump-and-dump lasts a long time (over
10 minutes, say, would be considered “long”), then those stats
will be “proudly” announced; if the volume is low or the
time between coin announcement and price peak is too short
(which is often the case), then the information is glossed over.
Such posts give newcomers, who can access channel history,
the illusion that pump-and-dumps are highly profitable.
Failed pump-and-dump attempts: Note that not every
pump attempt is successful. Figure 3 shows that the admins
decided not to carry through a pre-announced pump due to
unanticipated price movements of the to-be-pumped coin.
While it is unknown what caused these movements, the
case evidences that the admin is aware of the coin choice
before the pump (as opposed to the coin being randomly se-
lected and immediately announced at the pump time purely
by algorithm), and hence has the time advantage of hoard-
ing the coin at a low price before the coin announcement,
whereas group members only purchase the coin after the coin
announcement and slow buyers risk acquiring the coin at an
already (hyper)inflated price. It is generally known to pump
participants that admins benefit the most from a pump. So
why are there still people enthusiastic about partaking a pump,
given the risk of being ripped off by the admins? Because
people believe that they can sell those coins at an even higher
price to other “greater fools”. The greater fool theory also
forms the foundation of many other schemes, such as pyramid
scams or Ponzi games [5].
One may also hypothesize that in this case, someone might
have worked out the pattern of the coin selection and pre-
purchased a basket of coins with high pump likelihood that
happens to contain the actual to-be-pumped coin, which might
explain why the admin observed peculiar movements of the
coin. In the next section, we study the features of pumped
coins and their price movements to understand if it is indeed
possible to predict the to-be-pumped coin.
2.3 Regulatory and Ethical Considerations
Pump-and-dumps in the stock market nowadays typically
involve penny stock manipulation employing deceptive cam-
paigns on social media to amass gains and are deemed crim-
inal [27]. However, since many cryptocurrencies cannot be
neatly classified as investment or consumer products [22], the
applicability of certain securities laws might be ambiguous,
and to date, regulation of pump-and-dumps in the cryptocur-
rency market is still weak [23].
Yet, the crypto-market is likely to be considered subject
to common law and general-purpose statues even though it
has not been clearly regulated as either a securities market
or a currency market. While offenses of market manipulation
can depend on a defined market, outright fraud and decep-
tion do not. As pump-and-dump admins create information
asymmetry by not showing investors the full picture of their
scheme, they intentionally mislead investors for their own
financial benefit. As a consequence, when it comes to US
legislation, for instance, admins might be committing false
advertising under the FTC (Federal Trade Commission) Act
(15 USC §45) [15] or fraudulent misrepresentation. Of course,
practically speaking, these admins are frequently outside of
the US jurisdiction.
Pump-and-dump admins, aiming to profit from price manip-
ulation, are certainly unethical. Nevertheless, other pump-and-
dump participants are also culpable since their behaviour en-
ables and reinforces the existence of such schemes; ironically,
most participants become the victim of their own choices.
3 A Pump-and-Dump Case Study
We further study in depth the pump-and-dump event associ-
ated with Figure 1. The pump-and-dump was organized by
at least four Telegram channels, the largest one being Offi-
cial McAfee Pump Signals, with a startling 12,333 members.
Prior to the coin announcement, the members were notified
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Figure 4: Tick-by-tick movement of the BVB/ BTC market during the first
four minutes after the coin announcement.
that the pump-and-dump would take place on one of the Cryp-
topia’s BTC markets (i.e., BTC is the pairing coin).
Announcement: At 19:30 GMT, on November 14, 2018,
the channels announced the target coin in the form of a
OCR-proof picture, but not quite simultaneously. Official
McAfee Pump Signals was the fastest announcer, having the
announcement message sent out at 19:30:04. Bomba bitcoin
“cryptopia” was the last channel that broadcast the coin, at
19:30:23.
The target coin was BVB, a dormant coin that is not listed
on CoinMarketCap. The launch of the coin was announced
on Bitcointalk on August 25, 2016.5 The coin was claimed to
have been made by and for supporters of a popular German
football club, Borussia Dortmund (a.k.a. BVB). The last com-
mit on the associated project’s source code on GitHub was on
August 10, 2017.6
Although it has an official Twitter account, @bvbcoin, its
last Tweet dates back to 31 August, 2016. The coin’s rating
on Cryptopia is a low 1 out of possible 5. This choice high-
lights the preference of pump-and-dump organizers for coins
associated with unserious projects.
During the first 15 minutes of the pump, BVB’s trading
volume exploded from virtually zero to 1.41 BTC (illustrated
by the tall grey bar towards the right end of the price/volume
chart), and the coin price increased from 35 Sat7 to its three-
fold, 115 Sat (illustrated by the thin grey vertical line inside
the tall grey bar).
Price fluctuations: Further dissecting the tick by tick transac-
tions (Figure 4), we note that the first buy order was placed and
completed within 1 second after the first coin announcement.
With this lightning speed, we conjecture that such an order
might have been executed by automation. After a mere 18
5https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1596932.0
6https://github.com/bvbcoin/bvbcoin-source
7One Satoshi (Sat) equals 10−8 Bitcoin (BTC).
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Figure 5: Gap between buy volume and sell volume caused by the BVB
pump-and-dump. The figure shows a timeline from 48 hours before up to 1
hour after the pump-and-dump. For the illustration purposes, the timeline is
scaled with non-linear transformation to better display the development of
volume gaps during the pump-and-dump.
seconds of a manic buying wave, the coin price already sky-
rocketed to its peak. Note that Bomba bitcoin “cryptopia”
only announced the coin at the time when the coin price was
already at its peak, making it impossible for investors who
solely relied on the announcement from the channel to make
any money.
Not being able to remain at this high level for more than
a few seconds, the coin price began to decrease, with some
resistance in between, and then plummeted. Three and half
minutes after the start of the pump-and-dump, the coin price
had dropped below its open price. Afterwards, transactions
only occurred sporadically.
Volume: Figure 5 shows that the pump-and-dump induces
fake demand and inflates buy volume. While every pump-and-
dump participant would hope for a quick windfall gain during
a minute-long pump, the majority would not manage to act
fast enough to sell at a high price. Those investors would
either end up selling coins at a loss, or, if reluctant to sell low,
would hold the virtually worthless coins. This is demonstrated
by Figure 5, which shows that the buy volume exceeds the
sell volume, whether measured by the target coin BVB or by
BTC. The figure also shows small volume movements shortly
before the pump-and-dump, also observable in Figure 4(a),
which can be indicative of organizers’ pre-purchase conduct.
As the BVB blockchain is not being actively maintained and
the coin itself is extremely illiquid, any market movement
may be deemed unusual.
Figure 5 illustrates that the total buy volume (also including
the pre-purchased volume, though negligible) in BTC asso-
ciated with the pump-and-dump amounts to 1.06 BTC, the
sell volume only 0.58 BTC; the total buy volume measured
in BVB is 1,619.81 thousand BVB, the sell amount 1,223.36
thousand BVB. This volume discrepancy between the sell and
Exchange Volume (30d) No. markets Launch Country
Binance $21,687,544,416 385 Jul 2017 China
Bittrex $1,168,276,090 281 Feb 2014 U.S.A.
Cryptopia $107,891,577 852 May 2014 New Zealand
YoBit $797,593,680 485 Aug 2014 Russia
Figure 6: Exchanges involved in pump-and-dump schemes, sorted by 30-
day volume: No. markets is the number of trading pairs (eg. DASH/BTC,
ETC/USDT) in the exchange. Volume and No. markets were extracted from
CoinMarketCap on November 5, 2018.
the buy sides indicates a higher trading aggressiveness on
the buy side.8 This further suggests that many investors may
be “stuck” with BVB which they are unwilling to liquidate at
the low market price after the pump-and-dump. Those coin
holders can only expect to reverse the position in the next
pump, which might never come.
Low participation ratio: It is worth noting that the total
count of trading transactions associated with this pump-and-
dump is merely 322. That number appears very low compared
to the 1,376 views of the coin announcement message, let
alone the over 10,000 channel members. This indicates that
the majority of group members are either observers, who want
no skin in the game, or have become aware of the difficulty
in securing profit from a pump-and-dump.
4 Analyzing Pump-and-Dump Schemes
In this section we explain how we obtain data from both Tele-
gram and the various exchanges, which allows us to analyze
and model pump-and-dump schemes.
4.1 Collecting Pump-and-Dump Events
In this study, we examine routinely organized pump-and-
dump events that follow the pattern of “set-up→ pre-pump
announcement→ pump→ dump→ post-pump review” as
described in Section 2. This type of pump-and-dump involves
live instructions from organizers (see Figure 1 and Figure 3),
so encrypted chat applications such as Telegram and Discord
are ideal for broadcasting those events.
We are confident that it suffices to focus solely on pump-
and-dump events orchestrated on Telegram as every active
pump-and-dump group we found on Discord was also on
Telegram.9 Telegram is among the primary media for pump-
and-dump activities and announcements, and it would be both
unreasonable and unlikely for any pump-and-dump organizer
8Note that Cryptopia is a peer-to-peer trading platform which lets users
trade directly with each other; the exchange takes no risk position and only
profits from charging trading fees. Therefore, buying volume implies that
the trade is initiated by the buyer, which typically drives the market price up;
similarly, sale volume is initiated by the sell side and would drive the price
down.
9This observation has also been confirmed by the PumpOlymp team, an
online information provider specialized in cryptocurrency pump-and-dump.
to restrict the platform to only Discord, since the key to the
success of a pump-and-dump is the number of participants.
Telegram channels: Our primary source on pump-and-dump
Telegram channels and events is provided by PumpOlymp,10
a website that hosts a comprehensive directory of hundreds
of pump-and-dump channels.
PumpOlymp discovers those channels by searching pump-
related keywords — e.g. “pump”, “whales”, “vip” and
“coin” — on Telegram aggregators such as https://tgstat.
com/ and https://telegramcryptogroups.com/. An-
other source for new pump-and-dump channels is cross-
promotion on the known channels.11 To validate the incoming
data from PumpOlymp, we conduct an independent manual
search for pump-and-dump channels. We are not able to add
new channels to the existing channel list from PumpOlymp,
and we are not aware of any other, more comprehensive pump-
and-dump channel list. Therefore, we believe the channel list
from PumpOlymp is a good starting point.
Next, we use the official Telegram API to retrieve mes-
sage history from those channels, in total 358, to check their
status and activity. Among those channels, 43 have been
deleted from the Telegram sever, possibly due to inactivity
for an extended period of time. Among the existing ones,
over half (168/315) have not been active for a month, pos-
sibly because cautious admins delete pump-and-dump mes-
sages to eviscerate their traces. This might also imply that
the Telegram channels have a “hit-and-run” characteristic. As
described in the section above, one learns from participation
in pump-and-dump activities that quick bucks are not easy
to make. Therefore, curious newcomers might be fooled by
pump-and-dump organizers’ advertising and lured into the ac-
tivity. After losing money a few times, participants may lose
faith and interest, and cease partaking. This forms a vicious
circle, since with fewer participants, it would be more difficult
to pump a coin. Therefore, channel admins might desert their
channel when the performance declines, and start new ones
to attract the inexperienced.
Pump-and-dump history: Starting June 2018, PumpOlymp
has been gleaning pump-and-dump events organized on Tele-
gram. Using their API,12 we acquire an initial list of historical
pump-and-dump activities over the period of June 17, 2018
and February 26, 2019. For each listed pump-and-dump event,
the data set contains the pumped coin, the target exchange, the
organizing Telegram channel, the coin announcement time,
plus the price and volume data on the tick-by-tick level from
coin announcement up to 15 minutes afterwards.
We run plausibility checks to validate each record’s qual-
ification as a pump-and-dump. For example, if an alleged
pump-and-dump is recorded to have started at a time that is
10https://pumpolymp.com
11This is based on a conversation with a PumpOlymp staff member.
12https://pumpolymp.com:5001/api/allPumps and https:
//pumpolymp.com:5001/api/PumpMarketHistory/raw, only avail-
able for premium users.
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Figure 7: Cumulative counts of pumps and pumped coins on four exchanges
from June 2018 to February 2019.
far from a full hour (6:00, 7:00, etc.) or a half hour, then we
would be suspicious, because an organizer would normally
not choose a random time for a pump-and-dump. If there is no
significant increase in volume or high price around the pump
time, we would also be skeptical. In such a circumstance, we
manually check the message history to make a final judgment.
In most cases, the message either discusses the potential of
a coin or the record is simply a mistake. Note that we ex-
clusively consider message series with count-downs (e.g. “3
hours left”, “5 mins left”) and coin announcement; messages
on pump signal detection are eliminated from our sample.
In the end, we trace 429 pump-and-dump coin announce-
ments from June 17, 2018 to February 26, 2019, each of which
is characterized by a series of messages similar to those pre-
sented in Figure 1. One pump-and-dump can be co-organized
by multiple channels; if two coin announcements were broad-
cast within 3 minutes apart from each other and they target
the same coin at the same exchange, then we consider them
to be one pump-and-dump event. In total, we collected 412
unique pump-and-dump events.
Excluded data points: All the pumped coins in our sample
were paired with BTC. We also observed and manually col-
lected a few ETH-paired pumps, most of which took place
in other exchanges.13 Inclusion of those cases would require
data collection with other methods and resources. Due to their
rarity, we do not consider ETH-paired pump-and-dumps in
our study.
4.2 Obtaining Coin Data
Apart from consulting the online pump-and-dump informa-
tion center PumpOlymp, we retrieve additional information
on features and price movements of coins from other sources,
13For example, PLX on October 10, 2018 in CoinExchange, ETC on
April 22, 2018 in Bibox.
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Figure 8: Aggregate trading volume of pumped coins before and during a
pump.
in order to establish a connection between the information
and the pump-and-dump pattern.
Specifically, we use the public API from CryptoCompare14
for coins’ hourly OHLC (open, high, low, close) and volume
data on 189 exchanges, including Binance, Bittrex, Cryptopia
and Yobit. The API provides live data, which means users are
able to obtain price information up to the time point of data
retrieval. While historical minute-level data are also available
on CryptoCompare, they are restricted to a 7-day time window
and thus not utilized.
In the conventional stock market, pump-and-dump opera-
tors favor microcap stocks due to high manipulability of their
price [3]; we expect to observe a similar phenomenon in the
crypto-market. To collect coins’ market cap data, we use the
public API from CoinMarketCap. Because we are interested
in coins’ “true” market cap that is uninfluenced by any maneu-
ver, we purposefully chose to retrieve the data at 08:42 GMT,
November 5. We believe the market cap data retrieved are not
contaminated by Telegram organized pump-and-dumps, since
they typically start on the hour or the half hour and last only
a few minutes.
In addition to market trading data, we also retrieve coins’
non-financial features. Specifically, we use exchanges’ public
API15 to collect information on coins’ listing status, algorithm,
and total supply. We also collect coins’ launch dates using
CryptoCompare’s public API. For information that is not
contained in the API but viewable online (such as coins’ rating
data on Cryptocurrency), we use either page source scraping
or screen scraping, depending on the design of the desired
webpage. All our data on coin features are from publicly
accessible sources.
14https://min-api.cryptocompare.com/
15https://api.binance.com/api/v1/ticker/allPrices for Bi-
nance, https://bittrex.com/api/v1.1/public/getcurrencies
for Bittrex, https://www.cryptopia.co.nz/api/GetCurrencies for
Cryptopia, and https://yobit.net/api/3/info for Yobit.
(a) Pump and dump activities from June 2018 to February 2019
(b) Enlarged section of the highlighted area in (a) that shows one of the most recent
pump-and-dump
Figure 9: Pump and dump timeline. A green bar represents price increase
through pump, calculated as high price − open priceopen price ; a red bar represents price
drop after pump, calculated as close price − high priceclose price . All prices are denominated
in BTC, and from a 3-hour window around pump activities. Visit http:
//rpubs.com/xujiahuayz/pd for the full, interactive chart.
4.3 Role of Exchanges
Pump-and-dump schemes take place within the walled gar-
dens of crypto-exchanges. Binance, Bittrex, Cryptopia, and
Yobit are among the most popular exchanges used by pumpers
(see Figure 6). While those exchanges differ vastly in terms
of their volume, markets, and user base, each of them has its
own appeal to pumpers. Large exchanges such as Binance
and Bittrex have a large user base, and abnormal price hype
caused by pump activities can quickly attract a large number
of other users to the exchange. Smaller exchanges such as
Cryptopia and Yobit tend to host esoteric coins with low liq-
uidity, whose price can be more easily manipulated compared
to mainstream coins such as Ether (ETH) or Litecoin (LTC).
In general, larger exchanges are more reliable than smaller
ones. While both Binance and Cryptopia were hacked re-
cently,16 the former managed to remain operative, while the
16https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-08/
crypto-exchange-giant-binance-reports-a-hack-of-7-000-bitcoin
Exchange Number of
pump-and-dumps
Admins’ profit
(BTC), aggregated
Admins’ return,
aggregated
Binance 51 148.97 15%
Bittrex 15 0.92 7%
Cryptopia 180 44.09 57%
Yobit 102 5.54 52%
Total 348 199.52 18%
Table 1: Number of pump-and-dumps (348) considered in this analysis devi-
ates from the total number of pump-and-dumps (412) due to lack of price
data for some events.
latter halted trading and fell into liquidation.
Activity distribution by exchange: Among the 412 pump-
and-dump activities, 68 (17%) took place in Binance, 21 (5%)
in Bittrex, 211 (51%) in Cryptopia and 112 (27%) in Yobit. In
aggregate, 35% (146/412) of the time, the selected coin had
previously been pumped in the same exchange (see Figure 7).
Figure 8 compares the aggregate three-hour trading volume
in BTC of pumped coins before and during a pump-and-dump,
and the artificial trading volume generated by those pump-
and-dump activities is astonishing: 8,793 BTC (93% from
Binance), roughly equivalent to 50 million USD,17 of trading
volume during the pump hours, 9 times as much as the pre-
pump volume (943 BTC), and that only over a period of eight
months.
Figure 9 illustrates the occurrence and the effectiveness of
individual pump-and-dump activities. In terms of frequency,
Bittrex is most rarely chosen; Binance started to gain traction
only since September, but still witnesses far less pump-and-
dump occurrence than Yobit and Cryptopia. Turning to Yobit
with Cryptopia, we find that the two exchanges have comple-
mented each other: when Yobit was inactive (most notably
October 2018 to January 2019), Cryptopia experienced more
traffic; when Cryptopia went silent (since the hack in mid-
January 2019), Yobit regained popularity. In terms of percent-
age of coin price increase, pumps in both Yobit and Cryptopia
appear to be more powerful than those in Bittrex and Binance.
What goes hand-in-hand with price surge is price dip: coin
prices also drop more dramatically during the dump in Yobit
and Cryptopia compared to their peer exchanges.
Profit for admins: Even with tick-by-tick data for each
pumped coin during their respective pump-and-dump period,
due to lack of trader ID we cannot precisely match individu-
als’ buy and sell transactions. Therefore, to estimate profit for
admins, we need to make a few assumptions:
1. Admins purchase coins and enter sell orders only prior
to the pump.
and https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_
id=3&objectid=12231209.
17This is calculated based on the unit BTC price of 5,715 USD, which is
the mean of the high price of 8,250 USD and the low price 3,180 USD during
the data period.
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Figure 10: Views of coin announcement message versus coin price increase
during the pump. The figure illustrates the relationships between coin price
increase through pump, views of coin announcement message, pump volume,
and pump exchange.
2. Admins purchase coins at the price immediately before
the pump begins.
3. During the pump period — before the price reaches the
peak, investors lift the admin’s offers and push the price
higher; during the dump period — when the price drops,
investors transact with each other.
With those assumptions, we arrive at the estimation as pre-
sented in Table 1. We estimate that admins made a net profit
of 199.52 BTC, equivalent to 1.1 million USD, through 348
pump and dump events during our sample period. The esti-
mated return of insiders averages 18%, which aligns perfectly
with Li et al. [23].
So, what is the investors’ payout? Some investors win;
others lose. Since trading is a zero-sum game, the aggregate
investor loss would be on the equivalent scale as the aggregate
admin win.
Coin announcement views: While investigating the degree
of exposure in coin announcement messages distributed by
Telegram channels, we find a negative correlation (-0.162) be-
tween number of views of coin announcement and pump gain,
which is rather counter-intuitive, because one would think that
more views would indicate more participation, which would
result in higher pump gain. Two extreme examples: the coin
announcement of the pump on MST had 325 views and the
pump gain was 12.6%; another coin announcement of the
pump on PARTY had only 18 views, and the pump gain was a
whopping 533.3%.
This finding suggests that the number of views cannot ac-
curately proxy number of participants, possibly because: (1)
only a fraction of message viewers would actually participate
in a pump-and-dump; (2) if a user reads the message history
after the pump, his/her view would still be counted; (3) if a
user re-views a message 24 hours after his/her first view, the
user’s view would be counted twice;18 (4) some participants
18https://stackoverflow.com/questions/42585314/
telegram-channels-post-view-count
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Figure 11: Arbitrage opportunities: coin price (highest during the pump hour)
in pumped exchange versus price in other exchanges
might have retrieved messages via bots, which would not be
counted in number of views.19
Price increase: We further notice that although pump-and-
dumps in Binance generate more trading volume during the
pump hour (Figure 8),20 thanks to its large user base, coin
price increase through pumps is generally at a much smaller
scale than that in Cryptopia and Yobit (Figure 9 and Fig-
ure 10). This is possibly caused by high bid and sell walls
on the order book that are typical for large crypto exchanges
like Binance, which prevent the price from fluctuating signifi-
cantly even at coordinated pump-and-dump events.
Arbitrage: Pump-and-dump activities not only engender ab-
normal returns within the pumped exchange, but also arbitrage
opportunities across different exchanges. Figure 11 shows
the presence of a price discrepancy of the same coin during
the pump hour across different exchanges. Interestingly, coin
price can sometimes be higher in exchanges other than the
pumped one. It is also worth noting that most coins pumped
in Cryptopia are also listed in Yobit but not in Bittrex or Bi-
nance, and vice versa. This is because the former two have
more conservative coin listing strategies, which results in a
different, more mainstream portfolio of listed coins compared
to the latter two. While there may be trading strategies result-
ing from these arbitrage opportunities, they are outside the
scope of this work.
4.4 Capturing Features
Market cap: Figure 12 presents the market cap distribution of
coins pumped in different exchanges. Pumped coins’ market
cap ranges from 1 BTC (Royal Kingdom Coin (RKC), pumped
in Cryptopia) to 27,600 BTC (TrueUSD (TUSD), pumped in
Yobit). Half of those coins have a market cap below 100 BTC,
most of which were pumped in Cryptopia.
19https://stackoverflow.com/questions/49704911/
is-it-possible-for-a-telegram-bot-increase-post-view-count
20A pump hour refers to the clock hour during which a pump occurs.
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Figure 12: Distribution of coin market caps. Market cap information was
extracted from CoinMarketCap on November 5, 2018.
Pump-and-dump organizers’ preference for small-cap coins
resembles equity market manipulators’ taste for microcap
stocks [3, 24], and can be explained by the empirical finding
of Hamrick et al. [18] and Li et al. [23]: the smaller the market
cap of the pumped coin, the more successful the pump would
be.
Price movement: Figure 13 depicts time series of hourly
log returns of pumped coins between 48 hours before and 3
hours after a pump. We detect anomalous return signals before
pump-and-dump admins’ announcement of the pumped coin.
The signals appear most jammed one hour prior to the pump,
and less so before that. This is to a certain degree in accord
with Kamps et al. [20] who find that a shorter, 12-hour rolling
estimation window is more suitable for anomaly detection in
the crypto-market than a longer, 24-hour one.
The return signal before the pump is the strongest with
Cryptopia, where in numerous pumps, coin prices were ele-
vated to such an extent that the hourly return before the pump
even exceeds the hourly return during the pump. This can
be explained by the assumption that pump organizers might
utilize their insider information to purchase the to-be-pumped
coin before the coin announcement, causing the coin price
elevation and usual return volatility before the pump. The
analysis above provides grounds for predicting the pumped
coin before coin announcement using coin features and mar-
ket movement.
5 Predicting Pump-and-Dump Target Coins
5.1 Feature Selection
Based on the preliminary analysis in the last section, we be-
lieve pump-and-dump organizers have specific criteria for
coin selection and they generally purchase the to-be-pumped
coin before naming it to the investors. Thus, it should be pos-
sible to use coin features and market movements prior to a
Feature Description Notation
Market cap Market cap information extracted from CoinMarketCap at 08:42 GMT, November 5, 2018 when no
pump-and-dump activity in Telegram channels was observed ∗
caps
Returns before pump x-hour log return of the coin within the time window from x+1 hours to 1 hour before the pump return[x]h †
Volumes in coin before
pump
Total amount of the coin traded within the time window from x+1 hours to 1 hour before the pump volume f rom[x]h †
Volumes in BTC before
pump
Total trading volume of the coin measured in BTC within the time window from x+1 hours to
1 hour before the pump
volumeto[x]h †
Return volatilities before
pump
Volatility in the hourly log return of the coin within the time window from y+1 hours to 1 hour
before the pump
returnvola[y]h ‡
Volume volatilities in coin
before pump
The volatility in the hourly trading volume in coin within the time window from y+1 hours to
1 hour before the pump
volume f romvola[y]h ‡
Volume volatilities in BTC
before pump
The volatility in the hourly trading volume in BTC within the time window from y+1 hours to 1
hour before the pump
volumetovola[y]h ‡
Last price before pump Open price of the coin one hour before the coin announcement last price
Time since existence The time difference between the time when the first block of the is mined and the pump time age
Pumped times before Number of times the coin been pumped in Cryptopia before pumpedtimes
Coin rating Coin rating displayed on Cryptopia, 0 being the worst, 5 being the best. The rating considers the
following criteria wallet on {Windows, Linux, Mac, mobile, web, paper}, premine ratio, website
and block explorer
rating
Withdrawal fee Amount of coin deducted when withdrawing the coin from Cryptopia WithdrawFee
Minimum withdrawal Minimum amount of coin that can be withdrawn from Cryptopia MinWithdraw
Maximum withdrawal Daily limit on the amount of coin that can be withdrawn from Cryptopia MaxWithdraw
Minimum base trade Minimum base trade size of the coin MinBaseTrade
Table 2: Features included in the prediction model. ∗The feature is designed to represent a coin’s market cap in a normal setting, i.e. absent market manipulation.
While it might be useful to also collect coins’ historical market cap before each pump-and-dump, we have not found a public source that provides this type of
data. †x ∈ {1,3,12,24,36,48,60,72}. ‡y ∈ {3,12,24,36,48,60,72}.
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Figure 13: Time series of coin returns before and after pump. In each subplot,
the hourly log return of each pumped coin before and shortly after the pump
is superimposed. The vertical red line represents the pump hour during which
the coin was announced.
coin announcement to predict which coin might be pumped.
In the following exercise, we focus on predicting coins
pumped in one specific exchange for the ease of data harmo-
nization. We choose Cryptopia due to sufficient data collected
for modelling. Although the exchange ceased to operate on
May 15, 2019, our exercise demonstrates a proof of concept
for strategic crypto-trading that can be adapted for any ex-
change.
For each coin before a pump event, we predict whether it
will be pumped (TRUE) or not (FALSE). The formula for the
prediction model is:
Pumped = M(feature1, feature2, . . .)
where the dependent variable Pumped is a binary variable
that equals 1 (TRUE) when the coin is selected for the pump,
and 0 (FALSE) otherwise. Table 2 lists the features considered
in the prediction model.
Previous analyses indicate unusual market movements prior
to the pump-and-dump might signal organizers’ pre-pump
behavior, which could consequently give away the coin se-
lection information. Therefore, we place great emphasis on
features associated with market movements, such as price, re-
turns and volatilities covering various lengths of time. Those
features, 46 in total, account for 85% of all the features con-
sidered.
5.2 Model Application
Sample specification: We consider all the coins listed on
Cryptopia at each pump-and-dump event. On average, we
have 296 coin candidates at each pump, out of which one is the
actual pumped coin. The number of coins considered varies
for each event due to constant listing/delisting activities on
the part of exchanges. The full sample contains 53,208 pump-
coin observations, among which 180 are pumped cases,21
accounting for 0.3% of the entire sample population. Appar-
ently, the sample is heavily skewed towards the unpumped
class and needs to be handled with care at modelling.
For robustness tests, we split the whole sample into three
chronologically consecutive datasets: training sample, valida-
tion sample and and test sample:
Pumped? Training Validation Test Total
TRUE 60 60 60 180 (0.3%)
FALSE 17,078 17,995 18,135 53,028 (99.7%)
Total 17,138 18,055 18,195 53,208 (100.0%)
The training sample covers the period of June 19, 2018 to
September 5, 2018 and consists of 17,138 data points (32.2%
of full sample); the validation sample covers September 5,
2018 to October 29, 2018 and consists of 18,055 data points
(33.9% of full sample); the test sample covers October 29,
2018 to January 11, 2019 and consists of 18,195 data points
(34.2% of full sample).
Model selection: We test both classification and logit regres-
sion models for the prediction exercise. Specifically, for the
classification model, we choose random forest (RF) with strat-
ified sampling; for the logit regression model, we apply gen-
eralized linear model (GLM). Both RF and GLM are widely
adopted in machine learning and each has its own quirks.
RF is advantageous in handling large quantities of variables
and overcoming overfitting issues. In addition, RF is resilient
to correlations, interactions or non-linearity of the features,
and one can be agnostic about the features. On the flip side,
RF relies upon a voting mechanism based on a large number
of bootstrapped decision trees, which can be time-consuming,
and thus challenging to execute. In addition, RF provides
information on feature importance, which is less intuitive to
interpret than coefficients in GLM.
GLM is a highly interpretable model [28] that can uncover
the correlation between features and the dependent variable.
It is also highly efficient in terms of processing time, which
is a prominent advantage when coping with large datasets.
However, the model is prone to overfitting when fed with too
many features, which potentially results in poor out-of-sample
performance.
21Due to missing data on several delisted coins, this number deviates from
the total number of 211 pump events in Cryptopia, as presented in Figure 7.
Hyperparameter specification: Due to the heavily imbal-
anced nature of our sample, we stratify the dataset when using
RF [9], such that the model always includes TRUE cases when
bootstrapping the sample to build a decision tree. Specifically,
we try the following three RF variations:
Sample size per tree Number
Model TRUE FALSE Total of trees
RF1 60 20,000 20,060 5,000
RF2 60 5,000 5,060 10,000
RF3 60 1,000 1,060 20,000
We fix the number TRUEs at 60 for each RF variation, so that
the model may use the majority of TRUEs to learn their pattern
when building each tree. Model RF1 stays loyal to our sam-
ple’s original TRUE/FALSE ratio, with 0.3% of TRUEs contained
in each tree-sample. RF2 and RF3 raise the TRUE/FALSE ratio
to 1.2% and 6%, respectively. Note that while the sample size
per tree decreases from RF1 to RF2 to RF3, we are mindful
to increase the number of trees accordingly to ensure that
whichever model we use, every input case is predicted a suffi-
cient number of times. We use the R package randomForest
to model our data with RF1, RF2 and RF3.
With conventional binomial GLM, problems can arise not
only when the dependent variable has a skewed distribution,
but also when features are skewed. With heavy-tailed coin
price distribution and market cap distribution, conventional bi-
nomial GLM can be insufficient to handle our sample. There-
fore, we apply LASSO (least absolute shrinkage and selec-
tion operator) regularization to the GLM models. After pre-
liminary testing, we choose to focus on three representative
LASSO-GLM models with various shrinkage parameter val-
ues (λ):
Model Shrinkage parameter (λ)
GLM1 10−8
GLM2 10−3
GLM3 5×10−3
Higher values of λ causes elimination of more variables.
We use the R package glmnet to model our data with GLM1,
GLM2, and GLM3.
Variable assessment: By applying the specified models on
the training sample, we are able to assess the features’ rel-
evance to coin prediction. Figure 17 presents features’ im-
portance based on mean decrease in Gini coefficient with RF
models. We find that:
• Coin market cap caps and last hour return before the
pump return1h appear to be the two most important fea-
tures in predicting pumped coin using RF models.
• Features describing market movements shortly before
the pump, e.g. return1h, volumeto1h and volumefrom1h,
appear to be more important than features describing
longer-term movements.
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Figure 14: Model performance on the training sample measured by Precision,
F1 (left) and ROC AUC (right) at different threshold levels.
• Among all the features related to market movements,
return features are generally more important than volume
or volatility features.
• Exchange-specific features including MinBaseTrade,
MinWithdraw, MaxWithdraw, and WithdrawFee are
least important.
Figure 18 presents the estimated coefficients of variables with
GLM models, from which we obtain several findings in line
with what is indicated by RF models above. Specifically, we
notice that:
• When only one variable is included, return1h appears
to have the highest explanatory power on coins’ pump
likelihood;
• The positive coefficients of return features imply that
the higher the return a coin shows before the pump, the
more likely the coin is to be pumped;
• The positive coefficient of pumpedtimes implies that
pumped coins are more likely to get pumped again.
The variable assessment performed by RF and GLM is
coherent in that both find features representing market move-
ment shortly before the pump to be more important than
longer-term features. This echoes our exploratory analysis
illustrated in Figure 13 and aligns with Kamps et al. [20]. The
finding suggests the spontaneity of admins’ coin selection,
and the importance for strategic traders to obtain real-time
market data.
5.3 Assessing Prediction Accuracy
Both the random forest model and GML predict whether a
given coin will be pumped as a likelihood ranging between 0
and 1. We apply thresholding to get a binary TRUE/FALSE
answer.
Figure 14 depicts the in-sample fitting of model candidates
with the training sample as the threshold value changes. The
fitting measurements include precision, the F1 measure and
area under ROC (Receiver operating characteristic) curve.
Figure 14(a) describes the performance of RF models and
Figure 14(b) GLM models.
Precision represents the number of true positive divided
by number of predicted positive, and the precision line ends
when the denominator equals zero, i.e. when no TRUE pre-
diction is produced. Figure 14 shows that, among the three
RF models, the threshold value at which the line ends is the
lowest with RF1, and highest with RF3. This indicates that
absent balanced bootstrapping, an RF model tends to sys-
tematically underestimate pump likelihood, leading to zero
predicted TRUE cases even when the threshold value is small.
Compared to RF models, none of the GLM models is able
to produce high precision.
In terms of F1 measure, RF models again appear superior to
GLM models. Among the three RF models, the RF1 performs
best at a low threshold range (< 0.2), while RF3 performs best
at a high threshold range (> 0.4). RF2 resides in between.
The RF models’ superiority to GLM models is further
demonstrated by the ROC (Receiver operating characteris-
tic) curve in Figure 14. Among the three RF models, no
discernible difference can be found in terms of ROC AUC:
all exhibit high performance with AUC > 0.94. The GLM
models, in contrast, render an AUC between 0.63 and 0.88.
Due to their obvious inferiority, we eliminate GLM models
from further analysis. Figure 15 illustrates the out-of-sample
performance of RF models. The model performance with
the validation sample resembles that of the training sample,
remaining strong with regard to all three indicators (precision,
F1 and AUC). This suggests that the classification model
trained and calibrated on one period of data can accurately
predict a later period.
Both Figure 14(a) and Figure 15 suggest that balancing the
sample with various TRUE/FALSE ratios only changes the ab-
solute value of the pump likelihood output, but not the relative
one. This means the three RF models can perform similarly
in terms of Precision and F1 measure, when the appropriate
threshold value is chosen in correspondence with the model
(specifically, TresholdRF1 < TresholdRF2 < TresholdRF3).
5.4 Testing an Investment Strategy
To explore the model’s practical utility, we devise a simple
investment strategy. At each pump, we check which coin’s
predicted pump likelihood surpasses a predetermined thresh-
old, and we purchase all those coins before the actual coin
announcement (if no coin’s vote exceeds the threshold, we
will not pre-purchase any coin). Note that if we had the abil-
ity to short or use margin trading on the exchanges we use,
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Figure 15: Performance of RF models on the validation sample measured by
Precision, F1 (left) and ROC AUC (right) at different threshold levels.
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Figure 16: Investment return using different models at different threshold
levels.
potentially more options would open up for us.
Strategy: Specifically, for each coin that we pre-purchase,
we buy the coin at the open price one hour before the coin
announcement with the amount of BTC equivalent to k times
the vote where k is a constant. That is to say, with all the
coins we purchase, the investment, measured in BTC, on each
coin is proportionate to its vote supplied by the random for-
est model. This is logical because a higher vote implies a
higher likelihood of being pumped, and thus worth a higher
investment.
We further assume that among all the coins we purchased,
those coins that do not get pumped (false positive, “false
alarms”) will generate a return of zero, i.e. their price will
remain at the same level as the purchase price; those coins that
get pumped (true positive, “hits”) will be sold at an elevated
price during the pump. To be conservative, we assume that
with each purchased coin that gets pumped we only obtain
half of the pump gain, expressed as:
pump gain = high price−open priceopen price .
Returns: Figure 16 presents the relationship between the
aggregate return and the threshold choice.
Figure 16(a) illustrates the performance of the trading strat-
egy with the training sample. The figure shows that, in gen-
eral, the higher the threshold, which means we buy coins with
higher pump likelihoods and disregard others, the higher the
return.
Figure 16(b) illustrates the performance of the trading strat-
egy with the validation sample. As the threshold increases,
the return first increases and then decreases. This is because
the coins with the highest predicted pump likelihood in the
validation sample happen to have very low pump gain. When
the threshold is high, only those coins with high likelihood but
Predicted
TRUE FALSE Total
Actual
TRUE 9 51 60
FALSE 0 18,135 18,135
Total 9 18,186 18,195
Table 3: Confusion matrix of RF1 with threshold value 0.3 applied to test
sample.
low gain are included in the investment portfolio, resulting in
a low overall return.
As already mentioned at the end of Section 5.3, every model
has its own optimal threshold value. In terms of the magnitude
of the profit, with the right combination of threshold and
model, investors would theoretically enjoy a return of 140%
with the training sample cases (RF1 with threshold of 0.7),
and a return of 80% with the validation sample cases (RF1
with threshold of 0.3).
One should be mindful that if the threshold is set too high
(e.g., greater than 0.8), then the investor might end up not buy-
ing any coins, and consequently gaining no profit. In addition,
although high threshold comes with high precision, it also
leads to a low number of coins being purchased, increasing
the risk associated with an undiversified investment portfolio,
as demonstrated in Figure 16(b).
5.5 Final Test
Based on the training and validation results of specified mod-
els, we need to select one model and an accompanying thresh-
old value to apply to the test sample. Our ultimate goal to
maximize the trading profit using the selected model in com-
bination with the proposed trading strategy on a set of out-
of-sample data. Therefore, we base our decision primarily on
Figure 16(b). We apply RF1 and a threshold of 0.3 — the
combination that delivers the highest return in Figure 16(b) —
on our test sample.
To determine the investment amount in BTC for our trading
strategy, we need to examine the market depth. This is partic-
ularly important for exchanges with low trading volume such
as Cryptopia and Yobit. When trading in those exchanges, it
has to be ensured that during the pump-and-dump, the market
would provide sufficient depth for us to liquidate the coins
purchased prior to the pump. For example, if the total trading
volume in one event is 0.4 BTC, it would make no sense to
spend 0.8 BTC on the coin.
To this end, we calculate the average trading volume per
pump-and-dump at Cryptopia. We only consider “uptick”
transactions, i.e. where the buyer is the aggressor. This yields
a ballpark estimation of the market depth on the buy side.
We use this number, 0.37 BTC, as the baseline investment
quantity. This baseline amount, discounted by the predicted
pump likelihood, would be the investment value in BTC.
BTC Pump Assumed BTC
Coin Date Pumped? weight invested gain gain gained
wt q = Q×wt pg ag = pg/2 q×ag
BVB Nov 14 TRUE 0.30 0.11 283% 142% 0.16
CON Nov 16 TRUE 0.44 0.16 33% 17% 0.03
FLAX Nov 10 TRUE 0.58 0.21 135% 67% 0.14
MAGN Nov 13 TRUE 0.37 0.14 70% 35% 0.05
MAGN Dec 16 TRUE 0.39 0.14 85% 43% 0.06
OSC Nov 13 TRUE 0.65 0.24 297% 148% 0.36
OSC Nov 25 TRUE 0.52 0.19 100% 50% 0.10
SOON Nov 01 TRUE 0.58 0.21 10% 5% 0.01
UMO Nov 15 TRUE 0.55 0.20 60% 30% 0.06
1.61 0.96
Table 4: Purchased coins based on pump likelihood predicted by RF1. Only
coins with predicted pump likelihood of greater than 0.3 are purchased.
Investment weight equals pump likelihood. Q = 0.37, the average of total
transaction volume in a pump-and-dump event in Cryptopia. Only transaction
volume where the buyer is the aggressor is considered.
Table 3 displays the confusion matrix of the model pre-
diction with the test sample. The model suggests us to pur-
chase 9 coins in total, all of which are ultimately pumped.
Table 4 lists those 9 coins, their respective investment weight
and assumed profit. The return on the investment amounts
to 60% (0.96/1.61) over the test sample period of two and
a half months. Note that the effect of transaction fees (0.2%
on Cryptopia) on the investment profitability is negligible.
The result of the final test is very similar to that with both
the training sample and the validation sample when the same
combination of model (RF1) and threshold (0.3) is applied
(Figure 16), confirming the model’s robustness.
5.6 Caveats and Improvement Potential
Data: Upon availability, order book data, tick-by-tick data
before a pump and traders’ account information can also be
included as features.
Modelling method: Random forest with unsupervised
anomaly detection has the potential to improve the model
performance. In addition, other classification (e.g. k-NN) and
regression (e.g. ridge) models are worth considering.
Additional considerations: Regarding investment weights,
one may consider coin price increase potential (based on e.g.
historical returns) in combination with coin pump likelihood.
One must beware that in liquid exchanges, the trading strategy
only applies to small retail investment, since big purchase
orders prior to a pump can move the market, such that pump
organizers may cancel the pump or switch the coin last-minute.
Also worth factoring in is the market risk (e.g. security risk,
legal risk) associated with the nascent crypto-market.
6 Related Work
Over the past year, a handful of studies researching cryptocur-
rency pump-and-dump activities have been conducted, no-
tably Kamps et al. [20], Li et al. [23] and Hamrick et al. [18].
Our work differs from the aforementioned studies in terms of
motivation, methodology, data, and contribution. We aim for
prospective prediction as opposed to retrospective investiga-
tion of pump-and-dump activities. We use a homogeneous set
of data that only includes clearly announced pump-and-dump
events on Telegram.22 Regarding the sample period, our data
cover a recent time span of June 17, 2018 to February 26, 2019
(Table 5).
Our paper is also closely linked to literature on market ma-
nipulation in non-cryptocurrency contexts. Lin [24] explains
potential damage of various manipulation methods including
pump-and-dump, front running, cornering and mass misinfor-
mation, and argues for swift regulatory action against those
threats. Austin [3] calls for authorities’ demonstration of their
ability to effectively deter market manipulation such as pump-
and-dump in exchanges for small-capped companies, in order
to recover investors’ confidence in trading in those markets,
which would consequently foster economic growth.
Our paper is further related to research on crypto trading.
Gandal et al. [17] demonstrate that the unprecedented spike in
the USD-BTC exchange rate in late 2013 was possibly caused
by price manipulation. Makarov et al. [25] probe arbitrage
opportunities in crypto markets. Aune et al. [2] highlight po-
tential manipulation in the blockchain market resulting from
the exposure of the footprint of a transaction after its broad-
cast and before its validation in a blockchain, and proposes a
cryptographic approach for solving the information leakage
problems in distributed ledgers.
Our paper is also akin to existing literature on cryptocur-
rencies’ market movements. The majority of related literature
still orients its focus on Bitcoin. Many scholars use GARCH
models to fit the time series of Bitcoin price. Among them,
Dyhrberg et al. [13] explore the financial asset capabilities
of Bitcoin and suggests categorizing Bitcoin as something
between gold and US Dollar on a spectrum from pure medium
of exchange to pure store of value; Bouoiyour et al. [7] argue
that Bitcoin is still immature and remains reactive to nega-
tive rather than positive news at the time of their writing; 2
years later, Conrad et al. [10] present the opposite finding
that negative press does not explain the volatility of Bitcoin;
Dyhrberg [14] demonstrates that bitcoin can be used to hedge
against stocks; Katsiampa [21] emphasizes modelling accu-
racy and recommends the AR-CGARCH model for price
retro-fitting. Bariviera et al. [4] compute the Hurst exponent
by means of the Detrended Fluctuation Analysis method and
conclude that the market liquidity does not affect the level of
long-range dependence. Corbet et al. [11] demonstrate that
Bitcoin shows characteristics of an speculative asset rather
than a currency also with the presence of futures trading in
Bitcoin.
Among the few research studies that also look into the finan-
cial characteristics of other cryptocurrencies, Fry et al. [16]
22As suggested earlier, all the coin announcements we found on Discord
overlap with our Telegram data.
Kamps et al. [20] Hamrick et al. [18] Li et al. [23] This paper
Motivation Locating suspicious transactions
patterns through automated
anomaly detection
Identifying success factors for
historical pumps
Examining how pump-and-
dumps are correlated with
cryptocurrency price
Predicting the coin to be pumped
with input of Telegram signals
Methodology Breakout indicators & rein-
forcers
Ordinary least squares (OLS) OLS, difference in difference RF, GLM
Data Market data of cryptocurrencies
from April 2018 to May 2018 on
Binance, Bittrex, Kraken, Kucoin
and Lbank
Explicit (with coin announce-
ment) and suspected (no coin an-
nouncement) pump-and-dumps
from January 2018 to July 2018
Pump-and-dump events from
May 2017 to August 2018 on Bi-
nance, Bittrex, and Yobit, with a
focus on Bittrex
Pump-and-dump events from
June 2018 to February 2019 on
Binance, Bittrex, Cryptopia and
Yobit, with a focus on Cryptopia
Main finding
/
contribution
The authors develop a defin-
ing criteria set for detecting sus-
picious activity like pump-and-
dumps.
Pumping obscure, small-market-
cap coins is more likely to be suc-
cessful.
Pump-and-dumps are detrimen-
tal to the liquidity and price of
cryptocurrencies.
Pump-and-dumps schemes can
be found and foiled by machine
learning.
Table 5: Comparison of studies on cryptocurrency pump-and-dump.
examine bubbles in the Ripple and Bicoin markets;
Baur et al. [6] investigate asymmetric volatility effects of
large cryptocurrencies and discover that in the crypto market
positive shocks increase the volatility more than negative ones.
Jahani et al. [19] assess whether and when the discussions
of cryptocurrencies are truth-seeking or hype-based, and dis-
cover a negative correlation between the quality of discussion
and price volatility of the coin.
7 Conclusions
This paper presents a detailed study of pump-and-dump
schemes in the cryptocurrency space. We start by present-
ing the anatomy of a typical attack and then investigate a
variety of aspects of real attacks on crypto-coins over the last
eight months on four crypo-exchanges. The study demon-
strates the persisting nature of pump-and-dump activities in
the crypto-market that are the driving force behind tens of
millions of dollars of phony trading volumes each month. The
study reveals that pump-and-dump organizers can easily use
their insider information to profit from a pump-and-dump
event at the sacrifice of fellow pumpers.
Through market investigation, we further discover that mar-
ket movements prior to a pump-and-dump event frequently
contain information on which coin will be pumped. Using
LASSO regularized GML and balanced random forests, we
build various models that are predicated on the time and venue
(exchange) of a pump-and-dump broadcast in a Telegram
group. Multiple models display high performance across all
subsamples, implying that pumped coins can be predicted
based on market information. We further propose a simple
but effective trading strategy that can be used in combination
with the prediction models. Out-of-sample tests show that a
return of as high as 60% over two and half months can be
consistently exploited even under conservative assumptions.
In sum, we wish to raise the awareness of pump-and-dump
schemes permeating the crypto-market through our study. We
show that with fairly rudimentary machine learning models,
one can accurately predict pump-and-dump target coins in
the crypto-market. As such, we hope our research could, on
one hand, lead to fewer people falling victim to market ma-
nipulation and more people trading strategically, and on the
other hand, urge the adoption of new technology for regu-
lators to detect market abuse and criminal behavior. If such
advice would be heeded, admins’ schemes would crumble,
which would in turn lead to a healthier trading environment,
accelerating the market towards a fairer and more efficient
equilibrium.
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Appendix
RF1 RF2 RF3
caps 8.52 8.53 7.67
return1h 4.60 6.65 7.30
return3h 2.88 3.83 4.62
return12h 2.89 3.22 3.88
return24h 2.53 2.59 2.63
return36h 2.45 2.84 3.68
return48h 3.84 3.95 4.17
return60h 2.65 2.71 3.10
return72h 2.55 2.95 3.60
volumefrom1h 2.22 2.45 2.84
volumefrom3h 1.53 1.34 1.21
volumefrom12h 1.58 1.41 1.14
volumefrom24h 1.70 1.60 1.38
volumefrom36h 1.85 1.68 1.37
volumefrom48h 1.84 1.69 1.41
volumefrom60h 1.93 1.81 1.53
volumefrom72h 1.95 1.87 1.66
volumeto1h 2.64 3.27 3.19
volumeto3h 1.85 1.87 1.60
volumeto12h 1.86 1.70 1.45
volumeto24h 2.23 2.07 1.79
volumeto36h 2.42 2.18 1.87
volumeto48h 2.31 2.19 1.86
volumeto60h 2.40 2.30 2.01
volumeto72h 2.81 2.51 2.16
returnvola3h 2.02 2.30 3.07
returnvola12h 2.08 1.94 1.87
returnvola24h 2.17 1.96 1.73
returnvola36h 2.22 1.99 1.78
returnvola48h 2.44 2.10 1.69
returnvola60h 2.39 2.17 1.80
returnvola72h 2.30 2.09 1.67
volumefromvola3h 1.39 1.34 1.31
volumefromvola12h 1.57 1.42 1.16
volumefromvola24h 1.65 1.51 1.25
volumefromvola36h 1.75 1.55 1.21
volumefromvola48h 1.81 1.56 1.22
volumefromvola60h 1.79 1.56 1.25
volumefromvola72h 1.81 1.66 1.33
volumetovola3h 1.86 2.06 1.96
volumetovola12h 1.77 1.74 1.52
volumetovola24h 2.10 1.94 1.70
volumetovola36h 2.16 1.94 1.65
volumetovola48h 2.12 1.96 1.64
volumetovola60h 2.15 1.99 1.67
volumetovola72h 2.26 2.04 1.70
lastprice 2.14 2.02 1.66
age 2.20 1.88 1.69
pumpedtimes 1.31 1.65 2.52
rating 1.77 1.64 1.37
WithdrawFee 0.73 0.71 0.63
MinWithdraw 1.02 1.03 0.98
MaxWithdraw 0.43 0.36 0.28
MinBaseTrade 0.00 0.00 0.00
Figure 17: Features’ importance indicated by mean decrease in Gini coeffi-
cient. Higher importance is marked by darker cell color.
GLM1 GLM2 GLM3
caps 0.00 - -
return1h 2.76 4.75 5.02
return3h -0.04 - -
return12h 1.08 - -
return24h -4.81 - -
return36h 1.41 0.11 -
return48h 3.64 2.33 -
return60h 0.07 - -
return72h 1.21 - -
volumefrom1h 0.00 - -
volumefrom3h -0.00 - -
volumefrom12h - - -
volumefrom24h - - -
volumefrom36h - - -
volumefrom48h 0.00 - -
volumefrom60h - - -
volumefrom72h - - -
volumeto1h 1.61 - -
volumeto3h 5.99 - -
volumeto12h - - -
volumeto24h - - -
volumeto36h - - -
volumeto48h - - -
volumeto60h -2.88 - -
volumeto72h -0.49 - -
returnvola3h 3.94 - -
returnvola12h 4.41 - -
returnvola24h -9.39 - -
returnvola36h 10.40 - -
returnvola48h 9.10 - -
returnvola60h -12.57 - -
returnvola72h -3.93 - -
volumefromvola3h -0.00 - -
volumefromvola12h 0.00 - -
volumefromvola24h - - -
volumefromvola36h - - -
volumefromvola48h - - -
volumefromvola60h - - -
volumefromvola72h -0.00 - -
volumetovola3h -7.46 - -
volumetovola12h 1.32 - -
volumetovola24h -9.96 - -
volumetovola36h -2.13 - -
volumetovola48h 18.83 - -
volumetovola60h - - -
volumetovola72h 8.65 - -
lastprice -91.74 - -
age 0.00 - -
pumpedtimes 0.69 0.66 -
rating -0.16 - -
WithdrawFee -0.00 - -
MinWithdraw -0.00 - -
MaxWithdraw 0.00 - -
MinBaseTrade - - -
(Intercept) -5.43 -6.15 -5.95
Figure 18: Variable coefficients (unstandardized) using GLM. Coefficients
of variables not selected by the model are shown as “-".
